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Abstract 
Why did the identification of ‘Ash Dieback’ (Chalara Fraxinea) in 2012 in the UK catch the 
national media, public and political zeitgeist, and lead to policy changes, in a way that no 
other contemporary tree pest or pathogen outbreak has?The identification of Ash Dieback in 
the UK is conceptualised as a successful ‘focusing event’ and the ways in which it was 
socially constructed by the media, stakeholders and the government are analysed. National 
newspaper coverage contributed to the way that the disease was understood and was 
significant in driving the political response. Ash Dieback’s focal power derived from the 
perceived scale and nature of its impact; the initial attribution of blame on government; the 
‘war-like’ response from the government; and Ash’s status as a threatened ‘native’ tree. The 
Ash Dieback focusing event has increased the salience of plant health issues amongst 
policymakers, the public and conservation organisations in the UK. 
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The discovery of ash die-back in the UK:  The Making of a Focusing Event 
 
Introduction 
The media, public and political response to the identification of ‘Ash Dieback’ (ADB) in the 
UK in 2012 was unprecedented for a contemporary tree disease or pest outbreak.  The 
sustained national media coverage carried apocalyptic warnings of the end of the ash tree in 
the UK and a concerned public were encouraged to identify affected trees. The Forestry 
Commission conducted a UK-wide survey of ash trees in four days, the most rapid in its 
history. Central government entered ‘crisis’ mode with Owen Paterson, the Secretary of State 
for the Department for the Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (Defra), calling two 
‘COBR’ (Cabinet Office Briefing Room)1 emergency meetings to discuss ADB. 
The event catalysed new policy and governance structures in the policy domain of plant 
health, and generally raised media and public awareness of the issue. Discussion of the risk of 
new introductions of diseases and pests posed by the global market in trees and plants, of 
which very large numbers are imported into the UK, had been limited to concerned scientists 
working in the field of plant pathology  (see Brasier 2008) and some debate within the 
horticultural sector (RHS, 2008). It had never been articulated within the broader 
conservation movement in the UK as a particular concern. Indeed, ADB shone a spotlight on 
the practices of woodland NGOs who had been importing trees for new plantings, and led the 
Woodland Trust (WT) to set up the first campaign on the issue of tree diseases (WT, 2012). 
ADB is a fungal disease of the tree species Fraxinus excelsior and is caused by the 
ascomycete Hymenoscyphus pseudoalbidus and its anamorph Chalara fraxinea (Pautasso, et 
al 2013). It causes leaf loss and crown dieback, and is usually fatal (FC, 2014)
.
. Whilst older 
ash trees can take several years to die following infection, rapid mortality is frequently seen 
on tree saplings between 2 and 10 years old (FR, 2012). The disease was first noted in Poland 
in the 1990s and has subsequently spread to other countries in Europe. ADB is now believed 
to have been present in the UK for a number of years before it was first confirmed in 
                                                          
1
  The UK government’s emergency committee, which is convened during national crisis, is known as ‘COBR’ 
which stands for the ‘Cabinet Office Briefing Room’ where it meets. Its composition depends on the issue being 
discussed. 
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February 2012 on infected trees sent from the Netherlands to a nursery in Buckinghamshire. 
By July 2014 there were 666 confirmed findings; 26 in nursery sites, 355 in newly planted 
sites and 285 in established woodlands in the wider environment (FC, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the scale of the future impact is uncertain (Patusso et al. 2013), and it is not 
clear that ADB is the tree pathogen or pest that currently poses the greatest threat to the UK’s 
trees. The Forestry Commission (2014a) lists 16 ‘top tree pests and diseases’ currently 
present, but the formal identification of these other threats failed to have any significant 
impacts in the national media or biosecurity policy. Yet, their effects, and the steps taken to 
manage these outbreaks, are not insignificant in terms of ecological impacts and economic 
cost.
2
  
Here, I ask why did the identification of ADB Dieback catch the national media, public and 
political zeitgeist, and lead to policy changes in the Plant Health domain, in a way that no 
other contemporary outbreak has?  I start from the premise that the current domain of plant 
health contains ‘potential focusing events’ (Birkland 1997). I conceptualise the identification 
of ADB in the UK as a successful ‘focusing event’. After reviewing this literature, I draw on 
the social constructivist tradition to develop, through a narrative analysis of newspaper 
articles and semi-structured interviews, an analysis that looks at the ways in which the 
focusing event itself was discursively constructed by the media, stakeholders and 
government.  
Agenda-setting and focusing events  
Scholars of agenda-setting have sought to ‘understand why some subjects become prominent 
on the policy agenda and others do not’ (Kingdon, 1995, p3).  There is now an extensive 
literature on agenda-setting (see Pralle, 2009 for a review). Two of the most important 
theoretical approaches were developed in the US context: Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams 
                                                          
2 Between 2009 and October 2013 about 16,000 hectares of Japanese larch trees in the UK 
had been felled or were under notice to be felled due to Phytophora ramorum infection (FC, 
2014b). Oak Processionary Moth poses a threat to both oak trees and human health and was 
first identified in London in 2006.  It continues to be actively managed and the cost for 
government in 2013 was estimated at £1.15million (OPM Advisory Group, 2014). Acute Oak 
Decline is on the increase and can kill affected mature oak trees within 4 to 5 years of the 
onset of symptoms (FC, 2014c). Asian Longhorn Beetle kills species of broadleaved trees in 
countries where it has become established: an outbreak in Kent in 2012 appears to have been 
successfully controlled, but the management involved the removal of 2166 trees (FC, 2014d). 
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model looks at how problems get noticed and how issues move onto decision agendas, whilst 
the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2005) focuses on patterns 
of agenda stability and change and the factors that drive these. Whilst these US models have 
now been applied to policy contexts across Europe, there is still a lack of knowledge about 
agenda-setting in UK politics (Carter and Jacobs, 2010) 
Focusing events form part of Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams theory.  Kingdon notes that 
problems ‘need a little push’ to get government attention, ‘which is sometimes provided by a 
focusing event like a crisis or a disaster’ (1995, p96).  There is a significant literature 
providing empirical analysis of focusing events (Bishop, 2014; Vane and Kolvas, 2013, 
Jensen 2011, Leiserowtitz, 2011).  Birkland has developed the theoretical aspects in a series 
of publications (1997; 1998; 2004; 2009). His description of potential focusing events
3
 
attempts to avoid Kingdon’s ‘post hoc characterisations of the importance of events in agenda 
change’ (Birkland, 1997 p22). A ‘potential focusing event’ is defined  as 
‘an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful 
or revealing the possibility to potentially greater future harms; has harms that are 
concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is 
known to policy makers and the public simultaneously’  (Birkland 1997, p22). 
 
Birkland defines focusing events so that policy domains in which such as events are likely to 
be important can be identified, avoiding simply retrospectively choosing such events. His 
framework thus involves selecting all events within a domain over a number of years to 
understand which of these are or not focal. He outlines two phases over which focusing event 
politics proceeds: firstly, the news media responds immediately to the event, and secondly, 
there is a longer-term reaction by those active in policymaking (Birkland, 1997). Here, my 
focus is largely on the first phase, with detailed consideration of the role that the media 
played. Empirical analysis of focusing events has found a significant role for the media 
(Carter and Jacobs, 2013; Vane and Kalvas 2013). Birkland (1998) suggests that major events 
can reach the political agenda without group promotion if the coverage by the media is so 
                                                          
3 However in Bikland 1998 the word potential is left out without explanation for the 
difference with Birkland (1997), although the definition and the theoretical position appear 
the same. 
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large that it cannot be ignored by policymakers or the public.  Wolfe et al. (2013) argue that 
focusing events can shift the attention of the media onto new or previously unattended issues, 
and the news coverage can in turn focus the attention of the government and the public, and 
carve out ‘agenda space’. 
 
Social Constructivist Approach  
Birkland’s perspective and empirical analysis uses quantitative methods, but he touches on 
the role of social construction in agenda-setting stating that from this perspective problems 
‘are socially constructed through the use of symbols, beliefs and facts to tell the story of how 
conditions become problems’ (Birkland, 1997, p15). In the case of focusing events, he argues 
that how harmful or important accidents are seen to be is not just about empirical observation 
but is also a process of social construction. Earthquakes, hurricanes and oil spills ‘need far 
less interpretation by participants, than do nuclear power plants accidents… [that] are 
invisible […] and often difficult to characterise as accidents at all’ (p.129). This aside, it 
appears that there is currently no work looking explicitly at the social construction of 
focusing events.  
 
Narrative analysis is an analytical perspective within social constructivist approaches: 
‘human agency and imagination determine what gets included and excluded in narratisation, 
how events are plotted, and what they are supposed to mean’ (Riessman, 1993, p2). Elliott 
(2006) identifies three key feature of narratives: they are chronological in that they are 
representations of a sequence of events; they are meaningful; and they are social in that they 
are made for a specific audience.  An excellent review of poststructuralist narrative 
approaches in public policy is provided by Jones and McBeth (2010).
4
 In reviewing the key 
scholars (Hajer 1995, Fischer 2003, Roe 1994, Stone 2002), they report that ‘narratives 
occupy an epistemologically privileged position in making sense of a socially constructed 
world’ (Jones and McBeth, 2010, p334). Stone (2002) provides a framework for 
understanding symbolic representation in the definition of policy problems. One aspect is the 
identification of the narrative structure: ‘stories with a beginning, a middle and an end, 
involving some change or transformation’ (Stone; 2002, p138).  These policy stories use 
many literary and rhetorical devices. 
 
                                                          
4
 They go on to outline the Narrative Policy framework as a quantitative, structuralist and 
positivist approach to the study of policy narratives. 
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In the next section I outline how I use narrative analysis as a methodological approach to 
examining the social construction of the ADB outbreak as a focusing event. 
 
Methodology 
The object of investigation in narrative analysis is the story itself (Reissman, 1993). I use two 
key sources of data: media reports and a series of 10 semi-structured interviews. 
 
The ADB outbreak was covered by a range of news media. However, to ensure a manageable 
sample my focus here is on the national broadsheet daily and Sunday newspapers. Using the 
LexusNexis database, the search terms for the data were set from the period 9 June 2012 
(when coverage of ADB began) to 30 May 2014. The search terms were set to ‘disease’ and 
‘tree’ anywhere in the article, and ‘ash’ in the headline. This returned 253 relevant articles. 
 
Graphs showing the frequency of media reporting was produced (see Figures 1 and 2).  An 
initial reading of these articles enabled four chronological phases of the outbreak to be 
identified when the nature of the coverage of the story shifted from the discussion of one sets 
of issues or framing into another (see the next section). These phases were remarkably 
consistent across the different newspapers analysed and highlighted the role that stakeholder 
and government press releases had played in the way the narrative unfolded. This familiarity 
with the nature and timing of the media narrative was used to write an interview schedule for 
the semi-structured interviews. Once the interviews were completed, I returned to the media 
reports for second phase of thematic analysis (see below) and corroborating, or otherwise, 
issues raised in the interviews. A content analysis (Krippendroff, 2004) of key discursive 
devices identified by the interviewees was also carried out. 
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The methodological approach to interviews in narrative analysis is to analyse the ‘informants’ 
story, questioning how it is put together and the cultural and linguistic resources it uses 
(Reissman, 1993). Semi-structured interviews were carried out with individuals who had 
been involved in the ADB outbreak. They remain anonymous but they include civil servants, 
a journalist, and representatives of non-governmental organisations and trade bodies. I used a 
targeted sampling method (Newing, 2011). The initial long list of potential interviewees was 
compiled from a preliminary review of media reports and policy documents. This selection 
was confirmed and expanded using a ‘snow-balling method’ or process of chain referral 
(Newing, 2011). The number of interviews was limited by the willingness of individuals to 
participate given the sensitive and political nature of the issue. Nevertheless, interviews were 
carried out with 10 individuals representing a range of organisations and interests. Thematic 
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 Figure 1. Coverage of 'Ash Dieback' in UK Broadsheet newspapers 
from 1/06/2012 to 1/06/2014 
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Figure 2. Coverage of 'Ash Dieback' in UK Broadsheet newspapers  from 
25/10/12 to 26/11/12 
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analysis was completed. The themes highlight important elements of the data in relation to 
the research question and illuminate patterned responses or meanings within the data (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). A deductive approach was used as aspects of the transcript relevant to 
answering the pre-defined research questions were coded. Interviewees were asked to tell the 
story of the ADB outbreak as they experienced it, and to discuss why they thought ADB had 
caused such interest. These codes from across all the interview transcripts were then collated 
into themes; these were chronologically ordered to correspond to the four phases of the ADB 
outbreak presented in the following sections. 
 
The Ash Dieback Outbreak  
The analysis that follows is divided into four phases. Each of these is distinct in the way that 
the outbreak is being constructed.  Together these phases represent an overall narrative with 
each phase responding to the preceding one. In the first phase, ADB was ‘discovered’ and the 
media represented it as a serious threat, relying on information from the Woodland Trust 
(WT).  Blame was squarely directed at the government. In the second phase, ADB was 
discovered in the wider environment and media coverage peaked. The observation that ADB 
was also spread by the wind rather than solely by imports was used by the government to 
deflect responsibility. In the third phase, the government took back control of the framing of 
the event through the performance of a large survey and two COBR meetings. In the fourth 
phase, there was a realisation that it was too late to eradicate ADB, and that identifying 
resistant trees would be the way forward. 
Phase one: The call for government to ban imports 
 Figure 1 shows the newspaper coverage of ash dieback for the two years from June 2012 
which began on 9 June 2012 in a report that confirmed findings on a nursery in 
Buckinghamshire. The start of the intense period of coverage began on 25 September 2012, 
following a press release from the WT (WT, 2012a) calling on the UK government to ban the 
import of ash trees.  Significantly, the specific content and general discourse of this press 
release framed the media’s reporting of the issue in the period up to 30 September. 
The WT press release (WT 2012a) provided three important discursive devices that increased 
the sense of danger that ADB posed, which for the media appeared as ‘apocalyptic warnings’ 
(Interviewee A).The first was to compare the ADB outbreak with the Dutch Elm Disease 
outbreak of the 1970s, which led to the demise of over 28 million elms. It has remained an 
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important reference point in the public imagination (Tomlinson and Potter 2010). For the 
media this ‘was such a powerful line’ (Interviewee A); there were 131 references to ‘Dutch 
Elm Disease’ in the newspaper coverage. 
The second and third discursive devices were statistics that were widely quoted in the 
newspapers. Subsequently they were both shown to be inaccurate and exaggerated the 
potential risk posed by ADB to the UK. The first is a statistic about the impact of the disease 
in Denmark, to the effect that 90% of ash trees in Denmark had been killed by ADB.  There 
were 42 references to this statistic in the broadsheet coverage. At least one of the origins of 
the statistic is the WT press release (2012a) that states that ‘90 per cent of ash trees in 
Denmark having been lost in seven years’. Several of the interviewees discussed the error 
with this statistic in that 90% of trees have been affected by ash die-back in Denmark, but not 
90% killed:  
 “There was all this nonsense about 90% of trees had died in Denmark…which was 
wrong – 90% of trees had got infected, and a lot had got felled, but they hadn’t 
necessarily died” (Interviewee B). 
The Guardian newspaper subsequently published a correction to their articles (Hickman, 
2012) to this affect. Whether it was just down to “cut and paste” journalism (Interviewee A) 
or not, the (mis)use of this statistic contributed to the sense of scale of damage that ADB 
might cause. 
The second ‘mistaken’ statistic in the coverage was that “It is estimated that 30% of the UK 
wooded landscape is made up of ash which is found across woodlands, parks and hedgerows” 
(WT, 2012a). This statistic was used in the WT press release and was repeated, sometimes 
with reference to the wooded landscape and sometimes just to woodlands (7 occurrences). 
There was also frequent reference to the loss of a third of UK trees or woodland (33 
occurrences). However, this appears to be an exaggeration: The Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee (Mitchell et al 2014, p16) reports estimates that the proportion of ash in woodland 
ranges from 1.2% in Scotland up to 10.2% in Southern England. Kirby (2013) suggests that 
‘Reports that ash makes up a third of all woodland or 30% of woods have occurred but may 
be a misinterpretation that it is the third commonest broadleaved tree in Britain’. Later 
newspaper coverage used this statistic correctly. 
10 
 
The WT press release firmly placed responsibility for responding to the outbreak with 
government, calling on it ‘to put in place an immediate and compulsory ban on imported ash 
before it’s too late’ (WT, 2012a). This was repeated in the newspapers and there was a focus 
on the problem with imports: 
“An immediate ban must be imposed on them in a bid to protect our ash trees from 
this foreign invader.” (The Sunday Times, September 30th 2012 Editorial). 
The WT seems actively to have taken discursive control of the way the beginning of the 
outbreak was reported. With the discovery of ADB on nursery stock, the WT began to debate 
internally about the issue. It was decided that something that was immediate and achievable 
was to ask for the import ban, with lots of media comment and writing to government: 
“[…] within about three weeks, that ban had been announced and come into effect… 
we would have been one of a growing number of voices and we went on the front-foot 
with it” (Interviewee C). 
Situating responsibility for the outbreak with government is interesting because blame could 
have been laid upon those responsible for importing into the UK from the EU since 2003 a 
reported 5.2 million ash plants (FR, 2012), some of which were infected with ADB. One 
journalist argued that “everyone likes to kick the government” and that the government 
messing up is a “bigger story” than other groups such as the horticultural industry 
(Interviewee A). Indeed, criticism of the importing nurseries, or their representatives, the 
Horticultural Trade Association (HTA) is absent from the media coverage. However, the 
HTA was also on the front-foot in engaging with the media coverage of the story and their 
press release of 18 September 2012 (HTA, 2012) announced that it was calling on its 
members to abide by a voluntary moratorium on importing ash for planting in the UK. 
Representatives of the horticultural trade acknowledge that their media work at the time  
“was to make sure that the blame wasn’t going to just land on the trade and to protect 
the industry during that time, but [also] out of a genuine concern to make sure that 
these things should be avoided in the future, and potentially could be” (Interviewee 
F).    
The HTA press release (HTA, 2012) and the newspaper coverage at this point, and again later 
at the end of October, made reference to contact between the HTA and the Forestry 
Commission in 2009, when the HTA reported their concerns in a letter about the potential 
11 
 
impact of ADB if it was to reach the UK, following some of its members seeing the effects of 
the disease in Denmark.  This letter requested that a ban be imposed on imports of ash trees. 
However, the government responded that because the organism that was believed to be the 
cause of ADB was already present in the UK, it would not be possible to initiate an 
emergency response under the EU Plant Health Directive, which allows Member States to 
take action to prevent the entry and spread of diseases on their territory. In terms of the status 
of the scientific understanding of the disease at the time, this was a legally correct response. 
Plant pathologists’ understanding of the causes of C. fraxinea later changed, with the 
publication of research (Queloz et al. 2010) that identified the causal agent of C. fraxinea as a 
new species, not known to be already present in the UK.  Thus it is the delay between this 
information being known and the ‘discovery’ of ADB in the nurseries in February 2012 that 
raises more significant issues about the actions of government, but this was not a focus of 
reporting at the time.  
Another interviewee observed that there was a larger group of stakeholders who were 
implicated in the spread of ADB because: 
“…unbeknown, they’d been bringing in imported plants, and so I think everyone felt 
a little bit taken aback at what had been happening, that people hadn’t known it was 
happening, and ditto the HTA, even although…they wrote the 2009 letter, they were 
also a little bit vulnerable to criticism” (Interviewee D). 
The WT does acknowledge the role that it had been playing:  
 “We weren’t aware of the trade in people taking UK provenance seed, exporting it 
abroad, growing it on in bulk in Holland and Europe, and re-importing it.[…we 
basically said we are going to completely reconstruct the way that we deal with 
nursery suppliers on procuring both UK provenance seed and making sure that the 
seed is also UK grown. So that was the bit that had not worked from our point of 
view, and we had to hold our hands up and say, sorry, we got that wrong” 
(Interviewee C). 
It has since stated in its press releases that it has ceased to stop such imports (WT, 2012a; WT 
2012b). 
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On 4 October, the government appeared to respond to the media pressure by announcing that 
it was considering banning imports and was launching a consultation on it. (Defra, 2012). 
There was no attempt to challenge the framing of the problem by the WT and the media.  
 
Phase two: Ash dieback in the wider environment and the importance of the wind 
The media coverage stopped between 12 and 25 October. However for those in the Forestry 
Commission responding to the disease behind the scenes, there was a ‘game-changer’ 
(Interviewee B) moment during this period with the identification of ADB in the wider 
environment. Four sites in Norfolk and Suffolk were confirmed, using DNA analysis, to have 
the disease on 17 October. A three-week survey by the Forestry Commission of woodlands in 
East Anglia began on 22 October.  
The public announcement that the disease had been ‘found’ for the first time in mature 
woodlands as opposed to nurseries or woodland plantings is important. It was announced in a 
Forestry Commission press release on 24 October (FC, 2012) that it had been found in East 
Anglia. On the same day the WT (2012c) announced additional outbreaks in the wild in 
Suffolk. A third press release came from the Norfolk Wildlife Trust confirming ADB in the 
wider environment (WT, 2012). At this point, in hindsight, Interviewee B reported that it was 
because of these almost simultaneous press releases that ‘the national press latched onto it’. 
The media coverage increased, and daily coverage continued throughout November (see 
Figure 2). Many interviewees reported that the media interest in a tree disease was 
unprecedented: 
“I’ve never had anything which… the media had such an interest in as that… when I 
think how hard we work on some things to try and get media interest… and they 
suddenly, this on, we were fighting it off!” (Interviewee F). 
Interviewees were asked why there had been such a media response to and public interest in 
this particular disease when other outbreaks had received so little interest. There was a 
perception that because P.ramorum affects a conifer that isn’t ‘native’ there was not the 
media interest, although the impacts are much worse than for ADB (Interviewee G). Whilst 
this common view offers some insight into the lack of interest in P. ramorum, it does not help 
to explain the apparent lack of interest in diseases and pests affecting another ‘native’, the 
oak.  
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One consequence of the identification of ADB in the wider environment was, as the 
newspapers argued, that the anticipated ban on imports might not be effective. For example; 
 “A ban on imports of ash trees could be too late to stop a deadly fungus wiping out 
vast areas of woodland, experts have warned” (Gray, 2012).  
The anticipated ban on imports was announced by Paterson on 29 October (Defra, 2012a). He 
stated his belief at this point that the spread of the disease could be stopped: “By working 
together we can protect our native trees from this devastating disease.” 
However, another shift in the framing began to emerge with the observation that it might 
have been blown in from the continent to the eastern areas of the UK, and thus that the cause 
might be ‘natural’. From this point, the government began to take back some discursive 
control of the outbreak. It was able to deflect some of the criticism it was facing over not 
preventing imports. Its position was reported in the newspapers: 
 “He [Paterson] defended the government by suggesting the outbreak in East Anglia 
could have resulted from spores being carried naturally into the UK."I think the real 
concern is that, geographically, it looks like the disease may have arrived into the wild 
on the wind," he said” (McVeigh, 2012). 
Amongst the interviewees there was general consensus that the two pathways both 
contributed to the arrival of ADB. The map of confirmed infections (4 August 2014) shows 
the majority of sites in the wider environment are along the eastern parts of England and 
Scotland (see FC, 2014).   However, the map also shows that sites planted with imports are 
distributed throughout the UK. One interviewee thus concluded that: 
 “…Had there not been imports we would not have spread it rapidly around the 
country and we could have isolated it to the areas where we felt it had blown 
in…What imports did is it… spread it across the whole country and therefore has 
made it impossible to control” (Interviewee F). 
The debate around the different pathways of entry had important consequences, as 
Interviewee D noted:  
“…in terms of political perception, and media and so on, that was absolutely key and 
it was quite interesting, politically…as to whether it had come in on nasty foreign 
plants or whether it had been blown in on the wind”. 
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However, it could be argued that the identification of this ‘natural’ pathway does not remove 
the need for countries with the pathogen nevertheless to be proactive in management, and 
attempt to reduce the rate of spread to other countries.  
 
Phase three: The government takes action 
It is understood that the Prime Minister became directly involved with ADB from 31 October 
and instructed Paterson ‘to sort the thing out’ (interviewees). From that Wednesday, there 
was another discursive shift in the framing - ‘war was declared’ and the FC was deemed to be 
‘on a battle footing’. Paterson convened the first COBR emergency committee meeting on 2 
November to discuss ADB, an unprecedented event for a matter of plant health (Defra, 
2012b). Another interviewee described the situation in Defra: 
“…I used to go into Defra and there was literally… all the paraphernalia and sort of 
language of a crisis – daily bulletin boards, daily briefings… red alert, black alert… 
You’d go in the office there and it was like going onto a war footing – it was 
amazing!” (Interviewee C). 
Why was the issue escalated to a COBR meeting and this apparent level of urgency?  The 
Defra press release quotes Paterson as saying “The fact that we had a COBR meeting shows 
how seriously the government is taking the threat of this disease” (Defra, 2012b). It was 
observed amongst the interviewees that the very high level of media interest led to the need 
for a serious political response; the government’s “response only really kicked in when it hit 
the headlines” (Interviewee F). Some interviewees believed government remembered the 
political fall-out over the intended sale of the public forests and didn’t want a repeat with 
another tree issue. Others thought that it was less a reaction to a specific past event, but “the 
need to be seen to be doing something was quite important” (Interviewee D). 
Following the meeting, on the same day, Patterson announced a country-wide survey of the 
distribution of ADB (Defra, 2012b). According to one interviewee,  
“… [FC] Director General came out of that meeting instructing the FC that, as of that 
Friday … the whole of Great Britain had to be surveyed at four random spots per 10 
kilometres square by the following Tuesday lunchtime. […] We had, well, four and a 
half days, including the weekend, to survey the whole of GB…” (Interviewee B). 
15 
 
As a consequence the FC had to start asking for volunteers from the rest of the ‘Defra family’ 
to work over the weekend and join in the surveying. This survey was an unprecedented event: 
“…not to my knowledge had the FC as a whole organisation been put onto one single 
operation like this before…the focus shifted in total” (Interviewee E). 
Some of the interviewees reflected on whether it was really necessary to do the survey at that 
rate of urgency. Some felt that there was no reason beyond the political imperative for the 
government needing to be seen to be taking urgent action, and that a longer time-frame of a 
several weeks would have been fine. A different perspective (Interviewee E) suggested that it 
did provide some important information about the seat of the disease and where 
geographically the leading edge was, which would have been useful in the context of zoning 
the country for any future management strategy. 
The government framed it as an information collecting exercise that would allow the 
government to better target its efforts, but the identification of widespread infection in 
woodland in coastal areas, due to the wind spread, was anticipated (Defra, 2012b). 
Nevertheless, the tone was still optimistic that the disease could be controlled. Paterson also 
announced that he would hold a stakeholder summit, as previously called for by the WT.  
Three other policy developments at this stage were important. First was the setting up of a 
new ‘Chalara Core Stakeholder Group’ that included representatives of Industry and NGOs: 
 “… they summoned this thing called the Chalara Action Group  [to…] bring some 
external expertise to the table to help DEFRA through the crisis phase, as they saw it 
at the beginning” (Interviewee H). 
There was a genuine belief amongst the interviewees involved that this was a good exercise 
in stakeholder engagement:” 
“it was very small group, very focused, a group that represents a wide, lot of, 
interests, collectively, and it was a good process and Defra… they managed it very 
well actually” (Interviewee I). 
They had input into two policy reports; the ‘Interim Chalara Control Plan’ (Defra, 2012c) and 
the ‘Chalara Management Plan’  (Defra, 2013).  
With a broader remit, Paterson asked Defra's Chief Scientific Adviser to convene a ‘Tree 
Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce’. It was asked “to draw on and review the 
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evidence to provide recommendations to identify risks to the UK from tree pests and 
pathogens and on the steps necessary to prepare for and deal with outbreaks” (Defra, 2012d).  
The other significant change in the governance of tree biosecurity was the transfer of the 
plant health policy team that was located in The Food and Environment Research Agency 
(Fera), to Defra on 31 December 2013, as well as the UK Chief Plant Health Officer, in 
recognition of ‘the need to bring plant health policy closer to the heart of government’ 
(2012c).  
 
Phase four: From eradication to resistant trees 
In the fourth phase, the discourse changed again with the growing acknowledgement that it 
might not be possible to eradicate the disease. This sentiment, articulated by the UK’s Chief 
Plant Health Officer was reported on 5 November (McCarthy, 2012; Gray 2012a). At the 
same time, a new policy focus on resistant trees emerges. The Defra press release of 9 
November 
 
 (Defra, 2012e) quotes Paterson: 
“The scientific advice is that it won’t be possible to eradicate this disease now that we 
have discovered it in mature trees in Great Britain […] If we can slow its spread and 
minimise its impact, we will gain time to find those trees with genetic resistance to the 
disease and to restructure our woodlands to make them more resilient.” 
The Forestry Commission and Defra have funded a screening trial to identify resistance in 
UK ash trees. Trial sites will be monitored and any saplings showing resistance to ADB will 
be used for future breeding programmes (FC, 2014e). 
Discussion 
I began by asking why ADB became a successful focusing event when other pest and disease 
outbreaks did not. The preceding analysis has highlighted that ADB’s focal power derived 
from the ways in which it was socially constructed. 
The first aspect was the perceived severe nature of its impact, which was of interest to the 
media.  The national media coverage of ADB contributed to the narrative through which the 
disease was understood and was a significant factor in driving the political response. ‘News 
values’ are described as ‘the criteria employed by journalists to measure and therefore to 
judge the ‘newsworthiness’ of events’ (Richardson, 2007, p91). Within academic circles there 
is little consensus as to a definitive list or the order of this list (see Richardson 2007 for an 
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overview) but the ‘impact’ or the ‘magnitude’ is a common factor, (Lansen and Stephens, 
2007, Harcup and O’Neil 2001, Galtung and Ruge 1965).  The three discursive devices 
identified appear to assist the ‘newsworthiness’ of this event.   
Stone (2002) focuses on  the importance of numbers in policy analysis; a common way to 
define a policy problem is to measure it, and policy discussion often start with a recitation of 
numbers that purport to show the size of the problem. The WT provided the statistics through 
which the ADB problem was initially understood. Miller and Riechart’s (2000) analysis is 
useful in understanding the power of these figures; they argue that whilst journalistic norms 
stress values such as objectivity and fairness, this does not prevent journalists accepting 
‘facts’ from a source such as a stakeholder. Given that news often comes from an unexpected 
event, the first journalist who covers it may have little expertise or time to gather background 
information, and may be reliant on sources to provide the initial briefings and to set 
expectations. These briefings can then be important in framing the early news coverage.  
A second related moment in the ADB outbreak that was significant in its focal power was 
when it was discovered that the disease had ‘spread’ into the ‘wild’ and was no longer 
confined to nurseries and recent planting sites. The announcement by stakeholders through 
simultaneous press releases re-engaged the media as the perceived magnitude and impact of 
the disease was once again emphasised 
The third aspect of ADB’s focal power was the initial attribution of blame on the government 
at the early stages of the outbreak.  This can  also  be understand  in relation to news values; 
Harcup and O’Neil (2001) argue that reference to the power elite is the top news value, as 
suggested by the comments from the journalist interviewed. This framing of responsibility 
being with the government was reinforced by the other stakeholders.  
At this stage we can see the creation of a ‘causal story’ (Stone, 2002) in which the situation is 
seen as inadvertently caused by human actions. However, this construction of the problem 
did not last long with the emergence of evidence that the cause might not have been 
government failure, but an act of ‘nature’ with the Chalara spores carried in on the wind. 
Stone’s (2002) analysis is useful here to show how political actors strategically represent 
stories by constructing them as different types of causal stories; here we see a shift from an 
unintentional introduction of the disease through imports to aa ‘natural’ cause, shifting the 
responsibility away from the government.  
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 It is here that the fourth aspect of the ADB outbreak that contributed to its focal power can 
be identified.  However, this one was not constructed by the media but by government, who 
reconstructed the outbreak as a ‘war’, with the government ‘doing battle’ against the disease. 
Military metaphors have been recognised as playing a role in policy processes. They can be 
an effective way to convey seriousness of purpose and to create support for policies as it may 
be traitorous not to support the policy (Cohen, 2011, Stone 2002).  
The spectacle of COBRA and the survey were important factors in the government finally 
taking control of the ADB narrative. Stone (2002, p168) argues that ‘to call for a 
measurement or survey of something is to take the first step in promoting change’; ‘counting 
is political’ (2002, p179) and numbers can be used to tell stories.  One of the consequences of 
recording the presence of ADB over a widespread area was to support the narrative that it 
would not be possible to eradicate the disease and the focus would be on finding resistant 
trees.  
The final aspect of ADB that was important was ash’s status as a threatened ‘native’ tree. The 
cultural proximity of a story is an important measure of its ‘newsworthiness’ (Gultang and 
Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neil, 2001) and can help explain why ADB was considered more 
of a story than other diseases affecting ‘non-native’ trees. 
Conclusions 
I have sought to apply a narrative analysis to a successful focusing event in order to show the 
way in which it was socially constructed. ADB’s focal power derived from the perceived 
scale and nature of its impact; the initial attribution of blame on government; the 
government’s ‘war-like’ response; and ash’s status as a threatened ‘native’ tree.  
I have here focused empirically on the immediate response to the ADB outbreak. A series of 
policy reports relating to the future management of ADB were produced as part of this event, 
but it also catalysed policy action on the general issue of tree and plant diseases and pests, 
and future risks. The setting up of the ‘Expert Taskforce’ was significant:  the government’s 
response to the Taskforce’s report was the first GB wide Plant Biosecurity Strategy (Defra, 
2014). ‘Safeguarding Plant Health’ has become one of Defra’s four key priorities (Defra, 
2014). The setting up of a publicly-available ‘Risk Register’ for diseases and pests is of note, 
as is a discursive shift to thinking about the ‘resilience’ of woodlands (Defra, 2014).  
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Thus, as a successful focusing event, ADB has increased the salience of plant health issues 
amongst policymakers, and also with the public and conservation organisations in the UK. 
Nevertheless, the adequacy of these responses to the risks posed by future outbreaks 
continues to be questioned. It is argued that the sheer volume of the commercial trade in 
plants and trees makes it impossible that biosecurity measures can be enforced effectively 
(Rackham, 2014).  The fundamental reforms of the rules governing the international trade in 
plants and trees, deemed necessary on scientific grounds to prevent future introductions of 
known and unknown pathogens and diseases (Brasier, 2008), have not occurred.  
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